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Abstract 
From 1980, the UK state deliberately introduced numerous commercial 
mechanisms and private sector organisational principles into the public sector, against 
considerable opposition from organised labour and others. Such policies aimed to 
undermine many of the canons underlying state employment that had been gradually 
built up during the earlier part of the century (and particularly after World War Two). 
This paper discusses the conditions of the emergence and realisation of the 
intervention in terms of the reaction to economic crisis and the institutionalised position 
achieved by state trade unions. Thus, we identify the crises and ruptures, particularly 
the public expenditure crises from 1976 onwards and the political changes after 1979. 
The paper identifies the structures and actors influencing the restructuring process, 
including ‘New Right’ pressure groups and more autonomous public managers. 
Consideration of procedures and practices highlights the legislative and administrative 
actions of the state as well as broader ideological change. 
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Introduction 
 
The nature and goals of state intervention in work relations in the United 
Kingdom’s (UK’s) public services during the twentieth century can be divided 
into two broad phases. The first phase lasted for approximately the first three 
quarters of the twentieth century: during this time the state attempted, gradually 
and somewhat imperfectly, to achieve increasing control and regulation over 
employment conditions and to devise an orderly system of industrial relations. 
The mechanisms used included nationalisation, incorporation of peak business 
and labour organisations in economic management, and the promotion of 
centralised collective bargaining over pay and conditions. The state also used 
its legal and economic powers to try to spread certain positive employment 
practices within the economy generally. A second paradigm, influenced by ‘New 
Right’ and neo-liberal ideologies, overturned previous policy assumptions. 
Policies pursued in the second stage from approximately 1980 tried to reduce 
the size and scope of the state sector and to introduce market-like relationships 
into its functions. The relatively privileged status that the state had accorded to 
organised labour was comprehensively revoked. Public employment, the new 
‘model’ of industrial relations and state organisational structures became more 
fragmented, dispersed, and moved closer to the philosophies and practices 
found in the UK private sector. 
 
This paper is particularly concerned with the attempted deregulation of 
state employment that has occurred in the latter phase, during the final quarter 
of the twentieth century. Initially, we outline the formation of the type of 
regulation of state employment that preceded this. We then explain the origins 
and development of neo-liberal deregulatory policies pursued by the 
Conservative governments of 1979-97 and continued, in modified form, by the 
subsequent Blair Labour government. We emphasise that the process by which 
ideology was converted into actual state policy and practice was incremental, 
often haphazard, contested and imperfectly realised. To illustrate this, we 
discuss the example of the particularly controversial Conservative policy of 
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‘compulsory competitive tendering’, which required the local state to open to 
commercial tender the provision of a number of services that had traditionally 
been regarded as functions undertaken directly by public employees. This 
highlights conflict between the national and local state. The penultimate section 
sums up the main outcomes within the public services for employment and 
industrial relations of deregulatory state policies under the Conservative and 
Labour administrations from 1979, emphasising the extent of change, 
continuity, and the unintended outcomes that have occurred. The concluding 
section provides a broader overview of the nature of the changes seen, relating 
these to the conceptual themes of the States and Work Relations project. 
 
The contested character of the state as a ‘model employer’ 
 
The UK state’s role in employment relations during the first three-
quarters of the twentieth century is often characterised as aspiring to be a 
‘model employer’ for the economy as a whole. The era was characterised by 
increasing state employment; central regulation of public sector employment 
relations, particularly through the sponsorship of collective bargaining at 
national level; an increasingly inclusive approach to dialogue between state, 
unions and employers; and the use of the state’s influence to spread ‘positive’ 
public sector employment practices to private sector employers. 
 
In fact, such developments were achieved more tardily than is often 
recognised, and required the growing industrial strength of trade unions in the 
public sector to realise success. The rhetoric of the government as ‘model 
employer’ was often contradicted in practice by the reality of the practices of 
individual employing organisations within the public services (Lyddon, 2006; 
Thornley, 1995). Heightened class conflict, civil unrest and fear of revolution 
following the First World War led the UK state to gradually concede a model of 
orderly and stable employment relations. This consisted of relatively stable 
employment with the recognition of trade unions, and nationally applicable pay 
and working conditions negotiated through the institution of Whitley councils, 
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which gradually became the norm in the public services (Carter and Fairbrother, 
1999, 122-126). However, as Lyddon (2006, 7-9) and Thornley (1995) argue, 
the development of national bargaining and the Whitley council system in both 
the central and local state were highly contested processes in the inter-war 
period, with individual employers sometimes proving quite resistant to national 
bargaining (Lyddon, 2006, 7-9). Matters improved somewhat after the Second 
World War, when a number of industrial sectors with quite strongly organised 
workforces were subsumed under direct state employment, through the 
nationalisation of public utilities and some industries, such as coal and steel, 
and the formation of the National Health Service (NHS). As a consequence of 
the prevalence of national bargaining, one of the notable characteristics of state 
employment relations became a ‘relatively underdeveloped personnel role’ 
(Bach, 1999b, 179), which was particularly manifest at the level of the individual 
employing organisation. 
 
Although direct state employment had been relatively small during the 
early twentieth century, there was considerable debate historically over the 
extent to which the UK state should intervene to set an example in employment 
relations through the wider economy. Parliament generally accepted through 
most of the twentieth century that the state should use its role in public 
procurement to require private contractors undertaking work on behalf of central 
government to apply minimum standards of employment practices. To this end, 
the House of Commons passed three increasingly wide-ranging ‘Fair Wages 
Resolutions’, in 1891, 1909 and 1946. The 1946 Resolution asked contractors 
to central government to observe ‘comparable’ pay, hours and other conditions 
to terms applying within the industry concerned, to permit union membership, 
and it also promoted the use of collective bargaining by contractors (Fredman 
and Morris, 1989, 455-456). Evidence suggests, however, that the enforcement 
of these fair wages policies by government departments and the relevant 
arbitration bodies was considerably weaker (Bercusson, 1978). Nevertheless, it 
remains significant that the use of such ‘fair employment’ policies gradually 
spread from the early twentieth century until the 1980s beyond contractors to 
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central government itself to those seeking contracts from local authorities, 
health authorities and the nationalised industries too (Fredman and Morris, 
1989, 457-459). In the case of the local state, local authorities under the political 
control of the left-wing of the Labour Party were more likely to seek, and to 
enforce, particular employment and other requirements from potential 
contractors. 
 
In the post-World War Two era, macroeconomic management became 
characterised by Keynesianism rather than the neo-classical approach pursued 
until the 1930s. Beginning with the Labour governments of 1964-70, but 
continued by both Conservative and Labour administrations of the 1970s, there 
was an increasing emphasis on macroeconomic planning. Social concertation 
between the higher echelons of the state, organised business and labour was a 
new element of this, although this was a more diluted form of ‘neo-corporatism’ 
than normally found in mainland Western Europe (Berger and Compston, 
2002). In fact, the neo-corporatist dialogue became quickly dominated, 
especially by the mid-1970s, by Conservative and Labour governments’ 
attempts to restrain wage growth by either statutory or voluntary means. The 
1974-79 Labour governments tried to use their institutional links with the unions: 
 
by which the latter were supposed to practice voluntary wage 
restraint in exchange for favourable economic, social and industrial 
relations policies. The government pursued expansive spending 
policies in the hope of securing union cooperation but was left 
defenceless when many trade unions naturally sought substantial 
wage increases in the face of rapidly rising inflation. A rapidly rising 
public sector wage bill expanded public spending even further. (Hall, 
1992, 99) 
 
From government’s point of view, wage restraint was more readily 
achievable in the public sector, particularly when its major pay settlements were 
applicable nationally; this created considerable resentment among public sector 
workers during the 1970s. Trade union campaigns from the early 1970s against 
‘low pay’ in state work resulted in union leaders coming under considerable 
pressure from their memberships. Following the 1974-79 Labour government’s 
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public expenditure crisis in 1975-76, it adopted a new ‘cash limits’ basis for 
public sector financing under the shadow of a loan from the International 
Monetary Fund, resulting in the first appreciable attempts to cut expenditure on 
public services (Mailly et al, 1989, 8-10). The Labour government also became 
less willing to underwrite some of the pay settlements reached between public 
sector employers’ and trade unions’ negotiators through national bargaining. 
The consequence, by 1978, was a breakdown in both the incomes policy and 
the tri-partism, paving the way for the ‘crisis’ of the so-called ‘Winter of 
Discontent’, 1978-79. The rolling strike wave through this winter is of long-term 
significance for several reasons: while beginning among private sector workers, 
the more damaging political impact for Labour and trade union leaders came 
from the subsequent strikes by public sector manual workers; the official union 
leaderships largely lost control of these strikes to their rank-and-file members; 
the lasting perception within civil society – fashioned at least partly by a press 
increasingly openly influenced by the ‘New Right’ ideologies discussed further 
below – was of the public services and trade union power as major problems 
that the Labour government was too weak to resolve (Hay, 1996). The final 
consequence was the contribution of the events to the election in 1979 of a very 
different kind of Conservative government. 
 
Restructuring of state employment relations 
 
Policy origins 
 
What can be described as the ‘New Right’ paradigm (detailed, for 
example, Kavanagh, 1997, 76-78, 90-107; Swann, 1993, 135-141), as a critique 
of the previous patterns of economic, social and industrial management, 
emerged from diverse intellectual origins in the post-war period, but assumed 
coherence in the UK from the mid-1970s. Politically, the election of Margaret 
Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975 can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the perceived failures of Edward Heath’s 1970-74 Conservative 
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administration, particularly its support for the Keynesian consensus, for ‘ailing’ 
industries, and the extent to which the Heath government was undermined by 
the actions of powerful trade unions. From this essentially negative political 
basis, Hall (1993, 286) argues, Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative Party 
was increasingly based around deployment of monetarist economists and other 
elements of ‘New Right’ thought as a project with broader public and political 
appeal to provide an alternative to Keynesianism and neo-corporatism. 
Thompson (2007, 18-19) sums up well the interaction of academic thought, 
‘New Right’ pressure groups, and sympathetic media in propounding a different 
role for the state and public sector, as follows: 
 
The 1970s and 1980s therefore witnessed a well-articulated, well-
organised and, one might add, well-resourced assault upon the Keynesian 
social democratic conception of the role of the State, local government and 
public services within the British polity. And the ideas of the Virginia [public 
choice theory – PS/DF] and Chicago [monetarist economics – PS/DF] 
Schools, mediated by organisations such as the IEA [Institute for Economic 
Affairs], the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute , 
iterated in publications such as the Journal for Economic Affairs, 
popularised by journalists such as Paul Johnson, Samuel Brittan in the 
Financial Times and Patrick Huber in the Sunday Telegraph and 
championed by New Right politicians such as Keith Joseph, Nicholas 
Ridley and Margaret Thatcher, undoubtedly did substantial and lasting 
damage to it. 
 
In relation to deregulation of the state, we would amplify the influence of 
the US-based ‘public choice’ school of economics, which rejected the traditional 
principles of the ‘public administration’ model and held that public bureaucrats – 
buttressed by nationally powerful trade unions – acted to maximise their own 
resources, influence and interests, in contradiction to the interests of the wider 
electorate that ‘consumes’ public services (Massey and Pyper, 2005, 31-35). 
Policy organisations linked to the right wing of the Conservative Party, such as 
those mentioned above, argued from the ‘public choice’ perspective for policies 
to promote more competition, deregulation and private sector involvement 
within a reduced public sector (Foster 1991, esp. 46-47). We can summarise 
the basic aims of these groups as follows: the introduction of the rationality of a 
neo-classical free market within transactions in public services, unencumbered 
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by political ‘interference’ in the setting of priorities; to improve the efficiency of 
government, seeing the private sector as a model; and to increase the 
accountability of public servants for their decisions and actions, by devolving 
responsibility to lower levels in the governmental hierarchy, and thus creating a 
class of more entrepreneurial managers whose interests would become more 
closely tied to the economic success of the business units for which they were 
responsible. 
 
Strategy and tactics in the restructuring process 
 
The UK state has attempted to deregulate its employment and industrial 
relations in numerous ways since the mid-’seventies. The Table at the end of 
the text summarises the main policies followed by governments since 1974, 
which consist broadly of a progression from direct cuts, followed by divestment 
of public corporations and other assets, to numerous methods of decentralising 
the public management function and introducing market disciplines into the 
remaining ‘core’ services of education, health and public administration. The 
Table also indicates some of the main ways in which each phase of policies 
facilitated the fragmentation of employment relations in public services. Here we 
consider two aspects underlying these policies, the extent to which the 
unfolding of state policy has represented a direct strategy to deregulate 
employment and industrial relations and the tactics employed to attempt to 
realise the policies. 
 
There has been considerable academic debate about the degrees to 
which Conservative policy in this area represented the unfolding of a pre-
planned strategy or was ad hoc and opportunistic. While the Conservatives 
began to expunge at an early stage the power and influence of organised labour 
as an actor in UK public life, pursuing a policy of ‘labour exclusion’ (Crouch, 
1986), the approach to public sector employment and labour relations was more 
indirect. 
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The restructuring of the public sector in Britain after 1979, and 
the collapse of corporatist institutions (and with it the indirect 
influence of trade unions on public policy), were also crucial parts of 
the project of industrial relations reform that were achieved either 
through administrative action alone or through legislation whose 
impact on industrial relations was indirect. Nowhere is this more true 
than in the privatization of the nationalized industries and the 
decentralization, and creation of market surrogates, in what remained 
of the public sector. There was little or no legislation that sought to 
directly alter the institutions of public-sector industrial relations, but 
the wider restructuring of the public sector dramatically changed 
industrial relations practice. (Howell, 2005, 145-6.) 
 
Instead, state policy on public sector reform has focused on introducing 
numerous organisational innovations whose common feature is an attempt to 
engender market-like behaviour and structures within state services. Again, 
such ‘neoliberal reforms represented less of a coherent policy agenda and more 
of a series of experiments’ (Wood and Roper, 2007, 180). Changes in the 
character of state employment and industrial relations, in the form of greater 
entrepreneurialism, flexibility, decentralisation, and subordination to the logic of 
the ‘market’, were intended to be second-order results of the various policies. 
However, it was hoped that this method might be ultimately more successful 
than if a frontal assault sparking a direct confrontation had been attempted. 
 
Initially, the new direction of policy had frequently to be enforced by 
government departments using legal and administrative means against the 
reluctance and resistance of some individual state employers. This was visible 
in requirements that Civil Service, NHS and local state bodies should test the 
continued commercial viability of providing some of their services ‘in-house’ 
against external private sector firms (a particular example of this policy, relating 
to the local state, is considered below). 
 
However, as indicated above, policies of devolving operational and 
budgetary control more extensively within state organisations were intended to 
strengthen the autonomy of more entrepreneurially-minded managers, whose 
power would lie in the advancement of this new quasi-commercial ethos. By the 
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beginning of the 1990s, two developments were enhancing the influence of this 
semi-autonomous ideological dimension to state sector restructuring. Firstly, the 
concept of ‘new public management’ (NPM) became widely adopted to provide 
a coherence for ‘New Right’ policies for state restructuring, particularly as a 
result of the influence of the American academic text, Reinventing Government 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), which highlighted innovative reforms pursued by 
various public bodies in the USA of the Reagan and Clinton eras. Central to the 
vision of these policies was the centrality of the public service user as a 
‘customer’ (rather than as a ‘citizen’) able to exercise ‘choice’. At a political level 
in the UK, secondly, the Conservative Major (1990-97) and Labour Blair 
administrations (from 1997) saw electoral appeal in the citizen as consumer 
who would be able to exercise a form of ‘rational choice’ between different 
providers of services. The advent of Labour government has seen only minor 
changes of emphasis in the continued neo-liberal direction of state reform 
(Clarke, 2004; Thompson, 2007, 22-26). The role of the private sector as a 
participant in the delivery of state services, and funder of public sector projects, 
has actually increased under the Labour governments from 1997. However, 
Labour has reformed some individual Conservative policies of particular 
concern to Labour Party members and trade unionists in order to reinforce its 
electoral base, while conceding little institutional access to unions in policy 
formulation. The policies concerned include curtailment of the development of a 
so-called ‘two-tier workforce’ in state services (discussed further below). Also, a 
policy known as ‘Best Value’ requires that service quality issues, as well as 
costs, are taken into account when public authorities are considering whether to 
‘contract out’ services. 
 
Case study: competitive tendering of public services in the local 
state during the 1980s 
 
This section illustrates the development of a principal Conservative 
government policy – compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) – to introduce 
market disciplines and private sector involvement into labour-intensive manual 
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services provided by the local state; it also shows how the policy involved an 
indirect strategy to deregulate labour regulation within the local state. CCT 
required local state authorities to reorganise their direct labour departments 
along market-like lines and to open to public tender certain services they 
provided in order to assess whether or not the functions concerned could be 
performed more cheaply by external, private sector, providers rather than by the 
public authority itself. Competitive tendering embodied a largely indirect 
industrial relations logic, which proceeded roughly as follows (Foster and Scott, 
1998a, 107). Private service sector companies normally possessed the 
advantages of lower labour overheads, wages and levels of unionisation than 
their public sector equivalents. If the private sector operator bidding for work 
from the public sector won a contract, the firm would be able to vary the wages, 
conditions and collective bargaining rights of any staff that transferred from the 
public authority. If a local state authority wished to make itself sufficiently 
competitive to retain a contract against the threat or reality of private sector 
competition, its managers would have to devise ways to reduce costs and 
increase efficiency. Public sector trade unions at the level of the individual 
employer would be caught in a dilemma of whether to concede poorer terms 
and conditions in an attempt to retain the work or to risk losing bids (and union 
members) to the private sector. In either event, the power of public sector 
unions to defend their members, and their influence more generally, could be 
expected to weaken. 
 
A number of obstacles lay in the way of to this policy’s potential in 
transferring public sector work to the private sector. The 1946 Fair Wages 
Resolution and the European Economic Community’s 1977 Acquired Rights 
Directive (ARD) both posed problems to allowing competition on labour costs. 
The Conservatives attempted to neutralise these problems in their first years of 
government. Firstly, the Fair Wages Resolution required contractors to offer 
comparable wages, terms and conditions as the public sector, thus the 
Conservatives rescinded this in 1983. Secondly, the ARD, which safeguarded 
the terms and conditions of staff whose jobs transferred to a new employer, was 
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held not to apply to the case of public sector transfers when transposed into UK 
law as the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (TUPE) 
Regulations in 1981. TUPE occupies a significant place in this story that will be 
revisited below. 
 
The Conservative government was primarily concerned to replace 
politically-based resource allocation decisions within localities with seemingly 
apolitical market-based rational economic decisions based on cost. 
Increasingly, this required a transfer of power from the local to the national state 
in order to prevent the local state from countermanding the political intentions of 
central government. In the UK local state, elected councillors had considerable 
discretion in each local authority about whether services should be provided 
directly by the authority’s own workforce or not and, during the course of the 
1980s, control of local authorities by opposition party councillors increased. The 
Conservatives devoted a considerable amount of legislative time generally to 
circumscribing the independence of the local state, passing over forty Acts of 
Parliament relating to the local state in the period 1979-87 (Foster, 1991, 112). 
 
The ‘market’ for the expansion of private sector delivery of public 
services was actively created only by the continuing ideological commitment of 
government against the hostility of public sector unions and many employers 
within the local state (Foster, 1991, 50-92). Lobbying by employers’ pressure 
groups and ‘New Right’ policy organisations were important in maintaining 
central government’s persistence in pursuing the policy (Foster, 1991). Initial 
Conservative legislation to open to commercial tendering some local authority 
construction work in 1980 through the Local Government Planning and Land 
Act reflected the vociferousness of private sector employers’ groups in the 
construction industry (Evans and Lewis, 1988). A relatively small number of 
Conservative-controlled local authorities were sufficiently supportive of New 
Right ideas to experiment voluntarily with using private contractors to provide 
services, while the government tested out compulsory tendering in NHS 
catering, cleaning and laundry functions from 1983. 
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Because of the lack of enthusiasm within the local state for voluntarily 
relinquishing control over direct provision of their services, the Conservative 
government eventually conceded that legislation would be necessary to 
regulate the construction and enforcement of a market in local authority 
services. This proved a lengthy and complex process between 1985-1988, 
because of extensive opposition from the local state and trade unions to poorly 
drafted legislative proposals, but also because private firms needed extra time 
to bid for such a large expansion in potential contracts. The eventual 1988 Local 
Government Act required local authorities to submit specified services to a 
rolling programme of regular re-tendering. This represented one of the largest 
transfers of power in detailed decisions about provision of local services from 
individual local authorities to the Department of the Environment (DoE), the 
administrative department of government charged with oversight of the local 
state. To overcome strategies pursued by some local authorities and health 
authorities aimed at keeping their services ‘in-house’, central government 
forbade public authorities from accepting other than the lowest tender, setting 
minimum wages or unduly onerous ‘anti-competitive’ conditions in contracts. 
The government passed various orders and guidance to prevent such local 
democratic political intervention in public service provision at lower levels in 
cases where otherwise political contingency might exist in decisions about 
awarding contracts (Ascher, 1987; Foster, 1991; Foster and Scott, 1998a, 112-
114). Contractors were given the right to appeal to the DoE if they believed they 
had suffered from ‘anti-competitive’ actions of the type outlined above on the 
part of local authorities. 
 
Overall, the CCT policy had its most significant impacts on workers within 
the local state, as one official review concludes: 
 
Manual staff, in particular, have borne the brunt of the changes that 
have been made in working methods, pay and conditions, The large 
majority of authorities have made significant changes to staff pay, 
conditions or numbers in introducing competition, and many have continued 
to make changes after winning tenders. Patterns of negotiation have 
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changed markedly, with moves away from national and even local authority 
wide agreements. Management has become both more powerful and 
formal. (Walsh and Davis, 1993, 163.) 
 
The impacts on state employment relations of deregulation policies 
 
In this section we assess to what extent the various aspects of policies to 
deregulate the state labour market have succeeded and what unintended 
consequences have arisen. The different policies employed have had some 
common outcomes for labour relations and workforce management, regardless 
of whether particular services have been transferred to providers other than the 
public sector directly. Importantly, the threat of privatisation and marketisation 
has encouraged similar sets of reforms as in cases where transfer has actually 
occurred. The deregulation of employment can be observed in the following 
principal ways and with the consequences we outline below. 
 
Growing autonomy of managers, but more diffuse impacts for public 
service professionals. Historically, the sub-national management function in 
public authorities was underdeveloped within the paradigm of a bureaucratic, 
‘public administration’ model. It was essential for the success of deregulation 
that a more autonomous breed of managers developed, who were able to 
exercise authority and control within decentralised ‘business units’. Evidence 
indicates that the process of deregulation has resulted in rather different 
outcomes for managers and other senior ‘white-collar’ groups than more junior 
employees, resulting in greater workforce differentiation. Under the influence of 
the ideology of NPM, managers have been granted greater autonomy in 
directing the workforce. In some respects, deregulation has had more intense 
impacts on the jobs and responsibilities of general managers, who have had to 
learn new budgetary responsibilities, than on more junior workers (Doogan, 
1997). However, the autonomy granted to public sector managers is somewhat 
constrained compared to their private counterparts, although sub-sectoral 
variations exist (Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 2005). Managers are confined to 
overseeing the fulfilment of operational targets and performance indicators 
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within strategies and resource constraints all set at higher levels of the 
organisation (Foster and Hoggett, 1999; Hoggett, 1996). 
 
The impact of the recent changes on the working patterns and conditions 
of professionals within the public services is more uncertain. In cases such as 
the NHS, many key medical professionals have managed to maintain or to 
renegotiate their professional autonomy and discretion (Kirkpatrick et al, 2005), 
although all public sector professionals are more cognisant of financial 
pressures than formerly. Some evidence suggests that professionals have 
actually seen benefits from private sector involvement in public services or from 
their own transfer to private sector management compared to continuing under 
the resource and pay constraints applying in the public sector (Doogan, 1997). 
 
Greater flexibility and work intensification for junior staff. Clerical, 
administrative, manual and even some professional occupations have been 
subject to rationalisation and intensification as a result of various strategies 
employed to control state sector costs (especially unit labour costs) in 
increasingly devolved business units. Some argue that this represents a state 
strategy of ‘neo-Taylorist’ re-regulation in the public services (Pollitt, 1993). 
These trends are visible in an increased emphasis on the use of more flexible 
labour strategies, such as the use of part-time workers, fixed-term contracts and 
temporary agency staff (Kersley et al, 2006, 103-104). In recent years such 
trends have been compounded by the application of new technology in service 
delivery, such as through the increased use of call centres. Foster and Hoggett 
(1999) identify a culture of work intensification in labour-intensive parts of the 
state sector already characterised by low wage levels, which Hoggett (1996) 
characterises generally as a state strategy to produce a ‘high output / low 
commitment’ workforce. The large-scale Fifth Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey identified more evidence of employees complaining of intense work 
pressures in the public rather than the private sector (Kersley et al, 2006, 100-
101). 
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Importation of private sector ‘customer service’ nostrums. Rationalisation 
has been tempered by the interpersonal and unquantifiable characteristics of 
much service delivery. From the 1980s, attempts were made to apply private 
sector notions of ‘quality management’ to the public sector, although there 
remains considerable doubt as to how such concepts could be translated 
(Kirkpatrick and Martinez Lucio, 1995). Related to this, the hierarchical modes 
of control characteristic of the traditional ‘public administration’ model were 
replaced by more lateral, task- and contract-oriented networks of relationships 
between public and private sector staff who might be employed by different 
organisations. Especially under the Major and Blair administrations, an 
increased concern developed with ‘customer service’, where the ‘customers’ 
could be within different parts, or outside, of the organisation (Grimshaw and 
Hebson, 2005). 
 
Changes in organisational structure. Two types of changes in 
organisational structure were critical in education, health and the Civil Service: 
devolved management and an internal split between ‘customer’ and ‘contractor’ 
functions. As examples of the first type of change, in state education many 
decision-making powers and financial responsibilities were devolved to 
individual schools by the 1988 Education Reform Act. Head teachers were 
given greater freedom to decide on staffing, etc. Similarly, in the Civil Service 
the same kinds of powers were devolved to individual executive agencies after 
1988. The second type of change has been seen, for example, in the local 
state, as discussed in the previous section, and in restructuring in the NHS. The 
National Health Service and Community Care Act, 1990, saw the state 
introduce an ‘internal market’ into the NHS, whereby a series of semi-
independent NHS Trusts provided services to other parts of the public health 
service. 
 
Decentralisation of industrial relations. With the emergence of new, more 
localised employment relations actors came the decentralisation of much 
bargaining and industrial relations activity. This caused problems for public 
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sector trade unions, which were well organised for national-level bargaining, but 
relatively weak at workplace level (Carter and Fairbrother, 1999). The purposes 
of decentralisation were to remove political ‘interference’ from industrial 
relations and link industrial relations outcomes more closely to the financial 
fortunes of the individual employing unit. In the Civil Service, national bargaining 
fragmented as pay determination was devolved to each of some hundred or so 
executive agencies. This has led to a profusion of salary rates and pay rises in 
different agencies that, in the view of the Civil Service trade unions, has 
undermined the overall coherence of central government employment (Incomes 
Data Services, 2006, 30-36). A more complex picture presents itself in local 
government (Doogan, 1997), the health service (Bach, 1999a, 2004), and other 
parts of state education such as schools (Ironside and Seifert, 1995) of 
increasing decentralisation of industrial relations activity within largely resilient 
national agreements. National bargaining has been undermined by stealth at 
the edges in sectors such as local government by a minority of employers 
breaking away to set their own pay and conditions. By such means, the 
deregulatory trends promoted by government have made the public sector 
workforce and its industrial relations considerably less homogenous. 
 
Undermining trade unionism and collective bargaining. The 
Conservatives, in expanding managerial prerogative, also sought to shrink trade 
unionism and its role in collective bargaining as a means of setting pay and 
conditions. An increasing trend towards union derecognition in the devolved 
public services and privatised ex-public corporations was evident during the 
1980s and 1990s, especially for managers (Claydon, 1996), such as those in 
the Civil Service (Corby and White, 1999, 18). Although the Workplace 
Industrial / Employment Relations Survey series records that public sector trade 
union density fell from 84 per cent in 1980 to 64 per cent in 2004, this sector 
remains the mainstay of UK trade unionism (Millward et al, 2000, 94; Kersley et 
al, 2006, 110). Bargaining has undergone what Millward et al (2000, 194) 
describe as ‘an unprecedented fragmentation of pay-setting arrangements’. 
While these surveys found that the majority of employees in 94 per cent of 
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public-sector workplaces had their pay determined by collective bargaining in 
1984 (Millward et al, 2000, 194) this had fallen to 77 per cent in 2004 (Kersley 
et al, 2006, 185). 82 per cent of public sector workplaces had pay set by multi-
employer national negotiations in 1984, yet the drift towards setting pay at 
organisation level (especially notable in the NHS and Civil Service) through the 
1980s and 1990s (Millward et al, 2000, 194-195) had been partially reversed by 
the dawn of the 21st century (Kersley et al, 2006, 185). Certain major groups of 
public sector staff were deliberately removed by the government from collective 
bargaining in the aftermath of industrial disputes: this happened to nurses in 
1983 and to school teachers in 1987. 
 
The decline of ‘comparability’ as a principle of state employment. Until 
1979, the UK state observed the principle (although not always the practice) 
that public sector workers should enjoy comparable pay and conditions to their 
private sector counterparts for ‘like’ work. Governments now reject this in favour 
of the notion of affordability in relation to delegated financial budgets. As noted 
above, the Conservatives also considered that the TUPE Regulations were 
inapplicable to cases of transfers of public sector work to the private sector. 
This was intended to allow contractors to vary the wage rates, terms, conditions 
and other benefits of staff transferred from the public sector. Evidence suggests 
that the transfer of work to the private sector though competitive tendering and 
other forms of marketisation has resulted in deterioration of wages and 
conditions for transferred staff in an appreciable number of cases, as well as 
work reorganisation and intensification (Cooke et al, 2004; Doogan, 1997). 
Even where staff did transfer to the private sector on comparable wages and 
conditions, private contractors were, in any case, under no obligation to retain 
these benefits indefinitely, and many transferred staff onto new contracts after a 
period of time, either with or without financial compensation. Additionally, 
contractors took advantage of the fact that TUPE did not prevent them from 
hiring new recruits on inferior wages and conditions of employment. This 
gradually ushered in a form of dual system of employment, dubbed the ‘two-tier 
workforce’ by public sector trade unions, in some contractors, whereby 
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transferred staff coexisted with new workers hired on inferior employment 
conditions (Unison, 2000). 
 
European law intervened in the mid-1990s to contradict the 
Conservatives’ restrictive interpretation of TUPE as inapplicable to public sector 
transfers. In response to a number of cases brought on behalf of UK trade union 
members, the European Court judged that the UK government had failed to 
properly apply these regulations to cases of public sector transfers. The impact 
on labour costs of such judgments reduced the attractiveness of contracting-out 
to private sector companies, which were already on the defensive as a result of 
some effective campaigning against privatisation by public sector trade unions 
(Foster and Scott, 1998b). However, these judgments still failed to apply to the 
issue of the two-tier workforce for staff newly hired by contractors. Reflecting 
the more distant relationship between the new Labour government from 1997 
and the unions, the two-tier workforce issue was not resolved until the second 
term of the Labour Government after 2001 – and then only as a result of fierce 
and persistent union lobbying of the Labour government. After a number of 
statements and partial moves by Labour to outlaw the hiring of new employees 
on inferior wages and conditions to transferred staff, agreement to end the two-
tier workforce was reached between the Labour government and the trade 
union movement as part of the so-called Warwick accords in 2004, which set 
out a series of policy commitments from Labour due to be taken forward as part 
of a hoped-for third term of government. 
 
Concluding discussion 
 
Here we summarise our broad findings, referring to the project themes as 
appropriate. UK state employment relations during the twentieth century exhibit 
two distinct paradigms of regulation. Emerging particularly in the Keynesian 
period after World War Two, the state gradually constructed a system whereby 
public employment was increasingly regulated, predominantly at national level 
by public sector employers and trade unions. State bodies at local level had few 
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roles in employment relations. The state developed a role of setting an example 
as a good employer within the national economy as a whole, both by expanding 
the share of direct employment for which it was responsible and by promoting 
the role of neo-corporatist social dialogue within Keynesian macroeconomic 
management in the years to the late 1970s. By this time a crisis and rupture 
was inevitable, as the state’s roles as economic manager, promoter of industrial 
peace, and employer in its own right became increasingly impossible to 
reconcile: it was able to maintain neither wage restraint nor the full employment 
that was supposed to be delivered in return. Regardless of the ‘model employer’ 
image, relatively low pay in the public services – particularly for manual jobs – 
became a central rallying point for public sector unions and a frequent cause of 
disputes, culminating in the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ in 1978/79. 
 
The emergence of the neo-liberal model arose out of the political failings 
of both previous Conservative and Labour governments, but was given a 
persuasive public narrative through the activities of a confluence of increasingly 
influential New Right ideologues, pressure groups, media and politicians. State 
employment and the representative power of public sector trade unions were 
construed as political problems, but were judged sufficiently powerful in the 
early 1980s that the Conservatives chose to confront them indirectly and 
incrementally. It was left to the UK central state to actively construct a set of 
conditions, institutions and a highly interventionist regulatory framework for the 
project of building quasi-markets in the state sector. Government, spurred on by 
‘New Right’ and employers’ pressure groups that were afforded unusual access 
to the formation of state policy, were the most important actors, as the new 
‘freedoms’ had to be created, underwritten and maintained by continual 
intervention, legislation and regulation. 
 
Changes in core sectors such as health, state education and municipal 
government were achieved through the initial removal of intermediate layers of 
sub-national political accountability, which often proved hostile to central 
government designs. Instead, the key stakeholders of the new entrepreneurial 
  
21
state sector were now ‘apolitical’ managers, who were given discretion over 
detailed budgetary, employment relations and staffing matters within a series of 
new, devolved organisational structures – yet within strategic constraints still set 
by central government. The national regulation of pay and bargaining was 
partially downgraded, along with the influence within the regulatory framework 
of the trade unions, much of whose power resided at this central level. 
 
Nevertheless, the overall picture since the 1980s is one of continuity and 
change. Despite changes in working practices, state sector staff still retain a 
relatively strong ‘public service ethos’ distinct from the private sector. Yet by the 
end of the twentieth century the NPM had assumed the role of a new orthodoxy 
and the power of public sector workforces and trade unions were somewhat 
reduced, especially in manual occupations. The privatised public corporations 
and utilities had largely adopted the commercial ethos of the private sector 
(indeed, many such companies were no longer in UK ownership). The 
deregulation of state employment in the final two decades of the twentieth 
century, pursued through indirect forces such as competitive tendering and 
organisational decentralisation, have slowly fragmented the unity and 
comparability of public sector workforces, although this remains a far from 
uncontested process. 
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Table: Main phases of deregulation policy in the UK 
 
Appro
ximate 
period 
Gove
rnment 
Main policies 
pursued 
Main impact on 
state employment 
1976-
79 
Labou
r (Wilson / 
Callaghan) 
Public expenditure 
cuts, incomes policy 
through the ‘Social 
Contract’ phases 1-3, 
minor examples of 
privatisation (British 
Petroleum) 
Reduction in 
numbers employed; 
wage restraint 
1979-
83 
Cons
ervative 
(Thatcher) 
Public expenditure 
cuts; early experiments in 
privatision of public 
industries and in 
competitive tendering in 
local government and 
health service; introduction 
of general managers in 
health service (Griffiths 
Report) 
Reduction in 
numbers employed; 
‘competition’ to replace 
‘neo-corporatism’; 
dramatic reduction in 
‘social dialogue’; small 
increase in private firms 
winning public sector 
contracts; increased 
managerial autonomy in 
health service rather than 
professionally-based 
‘management by 
consensus’; gradual 
disengagement of state 
from direct intervention in 
public sector industrial 
relations 
1983-
90 
Cons
ervative 
(Thatcher) 
Privatisation of 
public corporations (e.g. 
telecommunications, gas, 
electricity); compulsory 
Introduction of 
private management 
practices into public 
corporations; changes in 
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tendering of manual 
services, especially in 
local government; division 
of Civil Service into 
autonomous ‘agencies’ 
(Ibbs report) 
management 
organisation and working 
practices in local 
government and health 
service; decentralised 
management in schools; 
continuing ‘labour 
exclusion’, and 
‘depoliticisation’ of 
industrial relations 
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Table, continued: Main phases of deregulation policy in the UK 
 
Appr
oximate 
period 
Gove
rnment 
Main policies pursued Main impact on 
state employment 
1990-
97 
Cons
ervative 
(Major) 
Controversial 
privatisations (water, railways); 
further extension of competitive 
tendering and private sector 
management of public services; 
expansion in the promotion of 
consumerism and individual 
choice in public services;  
removal of further education 
colleges and polytechnics from 
local authority control to 
become independent 
‘corporations’; reorganisation 
of health service to construct an 
‘internal market’ 
Greater increase in 
transfer of employees to 
private sector management 
by both compulsory and 
voluntary means; expansion 
in devolved bargaining, 
notably including 
decentralisation of 
bargaining to Agency level 
in the Civil Service  
1997- Labo
ur (Blair) 
Some further 
privatisation (such as air traffic 
control), increase in private 
sector funding and management 
of public infrastructure projects; 
more emphasis on service 
quality and ‘partnership’ with 
private sector providers within 
utilisation of a private sector 
business model for the public 
services, further reorganisation 
of, and decentralised 
management in, schools and 
health service 
Much increased use 
of private sector 
management and working 
practices; greater emphasis 
of importance of quality 
(rather than just lowest 
cost); some increased 
regulation of impact of 
transfers to private sector 
management on employees’ 
terms and conditions  
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